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Abstract 
 
Does the criminal prosecution of a corporation affect the CEO? Or do 
criminal actions directed at the organization itself pose few consequences for 
the individuals at the top, and the CEO in particular? While CEOs are rarely 
themselves prosecuted, organizations could discipline CEOs through paycuts 
or outright replacing the CEO in response to a criminal prosecution.  We 
sought to examine whether and how that occurs. We focus our analysis on a 
dataset of public companies that settled criminal cases brought by federal 
prosecutors from 2000-2014.  We compared those companies to the larger set 
of companies in the Execucomp database of S&P 1500 firms, focusing on CEO 
compensation and turnover during the same time period. We examined the 
time period before and after prosecution, and the year that the company 
resolved the criminal charges against the company.  We found that in the year 
that the company settled its prosecution, through a guilty plea or a deferred or 
non-prosecution agreement, there was a significantly higher level of CEO 
turnover. However, we do not find evidence of CEO pay cut.  Second, for the 
prosecuted firms that did not have CEO turnover after prosecution, there is no 
evidence of a reduction in compensation. Indeed, we observed a spike in CEO 
bonuses in the year of prosecution—confirming concerns expressed by judges, 
prosecutors, lawmakers, and academics that corporate prosecutions do not 
sufficiently impact high-level decision-makers like CEOs.  For the prosecuted 
firms that did have CEO turnover after prosecution, there is some evidence of 
a pay cut, both to salary and bonus, prior to the replacement of the CEO.  These 
results raise larger questions whether federal prosecutors targeting the most 
serious corporate crimes sufficiently incentivize accountability at the top. 
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Introduction 
 
When a major bank or corporation is prosecuted, then-U.S. Attorney for 
the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara famously explained that the 
company facing charges will present a “Chicken Little routine” describing the 
dire consequences of a prosecution for the company, but that typically, after 
settling the criminal case, “the sky does not fall.”  Instead, Bharara 
maintained, all too often “the sky brightens,” the firm is seen as having put its 
problems behind it, and “the CEO even gets a raise.” (Bharara, 2011). Other 
commentators have been skeptical that prosecutions of a company alter 
behavior of high-level officers such as CEOs.  Some have argued that it takes 
individual-level prosecutions to deter corporate crime.  “That, to me, achieves 
great deterrence, when a white-collar executive of a company says, ‘Wow, if I 
break the law, there is a chance that I could go to jail,’” as Judge John S. 
Martin, Jr. has put it. (Martin, 2006).  
To be sure, sometimes, the CEO appears to be affected by a possible 
prosecution of the company.  The CEO of Wells Fargo stepped down without 
any criminal prosecution initiated, after civil enforcement and high-profile 
Congressional hearings brought public attention to bear on unlawful sales 
tactics the bank used. (Glazer, 2016).  
Are CEOs punished for corporate crime, or do they remain above the 
fray entirely, or do they even receive rewards, like a pay raise?  CEO 
compensation has continued to dramatically rise in the United States, and 
perhaps that rise is insensitive to serious misconduct or even crimes at a 
company. Even if a firm is responsive to a corporate prosecution and attempts 
to clean house, perhaps it might not hold those at the top accountable.  A firm 
might be correct not to hold a CEO responsible. A CEO may not have been 
involved in the crime and might not have been in the best position to detect or 
prevent the activity.  A firm can be federally prosecuted for the actions of 
employees or officers at any level.  
If firms do hold the CEO accountable, we wondered how: by firing a 
CEO, or reducing pay or bonuses to reflect the harm of a criminal prosecution?  
If firms hold executives accountable in different ways, we wondered what 
characteristics might explain those differences.  These questions have not been 
explored in the literature.  We aimed to examine those questions, enabled by a 
hand-collected data set concerning public companies that settled criminal 
cases brought by federal prosecutors from 2000-2015.  We compared those 
companies to the larger set of companies in the Execucomp database of S&P 
1500 firms, focusing again on CEO pay and turnover during the same time 
period. 
 On the theory that CEO compensation is closely connected to 
performance, one might expect CEOs to be rewarded for criminality, before it 
is detected if fraud or rule-breaking allowed the company to achieve higher 
DO HEADS ROLL?   
 
 3 
returns.  Once the company is caught and prosecuted, however, one might 
expect the CEOs fortunes to change along with that of the company.  If criminal 
prosecutions are treated as a more serious failure of governance than civil 
violations, perhaps the Board would dismiss the CEO to restore the company’s 
reputation and leadership.  Or perhaps profitable risk-taking would continue 
to be rewarded by management and shareholders.  Perhaps, if the CEO did not 
personally know of the criminal actions, a CEO can often make the case that 
any compliance failures were not leadership failures and will be corrected 
going forward.  Federal prosecutions of the CEOs themselves are 
comparatively quite rare.  (Garrett, 2015). Having resolved a criminal case, 
perhaps the CEO would be rewarded for having navigated a difficult time for 
the company.  We were uncertain whether CEOs would suffer adverse 
consequences when corporations are prosecuted or receive outright rewards, 
as U.S. Attorney Bharara suggested. 
We began our research with a set of hand-collected data concerning each 
federal prosecution of an organization from 2000 to present, assembled by one 
of the authors.  We then focused on the public companies for which data was 
available in the Execucomp database—our sample consisted of 109 public 
companies, listed in Appendix A.  We examined the time period before and 
after prosecution, and the year that the company resolved the criminal charges 
against the company.  We found that in the year that the company settled its 
prosecution, through a guilty plea or a deferred or non-prosecution agreement, 
there was a significantly high level of CEO turnover in the year of prosecution. 
The result is driven by forced turnovers, as classified by Jenter and Kanaan 
(2015) and Peters and Wagner (2014). Appendix B displays the list of twenty-
five CEOs replaced in the prosecution year.  However, we do not find evidence 
of a CEO pay cut.  Focusing on the prosecuted firms that did not experience 
CEO turnover after the prosecution, we observe a spike in bonus in the year of 
prosecution—confirming U.S. Attorney Bharara’s concerns. Second, for the 
prosecuted firms that do have CEO turnover after prosecution, there is some 
evidence of a pay cut prior to replacement of the CEO. Specifically, salary and 
bonus are significantly lower in the year prior to prosecution.   
These results suggest that CEOs are not always disciplined in criminal 
matters, and that only a subset of firms hold CEO’s accountable after a 
criminal prosecution.1 This runs contrary to the stated purpose of corporate 
criminal prosecutions: federal prosecutors say that they target the entire 
corporation only when the governance and compliance failures are particularly 
systemic and pervasive, tolerated or encouraged by higher-ups, and not just 
due to conduct by isolated rogue employees.  If CEOs at the firms prosecuted 
for particularly systemic criminal violations do not face adverse internal 
                                                        
1 This study focuses on prosecutions’ immediate consequences to CEOs such as turnover and pay cut. 
Prosecutions may also have long-term career consequences such as reputation penalties. We do not study 
long term career consequences in this paper. However, given that we do not find the short-term consequences 
impactful, it is unlikely that the long-term career effect (if any) will be more significant.    
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consequences, then the disciplinary and deterrent effect of criminal 
prosecutions is cast into doubt, particularly because CEOs themselves are 
rarely prosecuted.  (Garrett, 2015).  To be sure, research suggests that forced 
turnover among CEOs has in general declined during the past fifteen years.  
(Karlsson, 2015).  Perhaps criminal prosecutions of corporations have 
increased at a time when CEOs have become increasingly insulated from firing 
for any reason at all.  
These findings also implicate the goals of modern executive 
compensation, designed to align interests of executives with firm performance 
by making compensation incentive based.  Perhaps use of bonuses and other 
perks can increase incentives to be productive.  However, many have criticized 
the structure of modern executive compensation and the agency problems it 
can create (e.g. Bebchuck 2003), based on a concern that it promotes short-
term decisions or undue risk taking, and still more have criticized the sheer 
size of CEO compensation in particular and the remarkable rise of CEO pay 
over the past three decades.  (Mishel 2015). Scholars have long argued that 
badly aligned compensation, including CEO compensation, can create 
incentives for corporate crime (Arlen, 1997). An underlying concern is that the 
structure of CEO compensation in particular may contribute to rule-breaking.  
Some studies suggest that the financial incentives of CEOs are far greater 
(50% greater) at firms that engage in fraud, including Burns and Kedia 2006; 
Bruner, 2008; Peng, 2008, Johnson, 2009; and Feng, 2011.   
 The first Part of this Article describes the legal standards for federal 
corporate prosecutions and the current practices and guidelines for prosecuting 
corporations, as well as data concerning the relatively infrequent prosecution 
of individuals and CEOs of those companies.  Second, we describe our data 
sources, including hand-collected data concerning public firms prosecuted 
between 2000 and 2015, and executive compensation and turnover data.  
Third, we present our results. Finally, we conclude and describe the 
implications of these results for future research and policy. 
 
I.  How Corporations and CEOs are Prosecuted (and Not) 
 
Corporations may be prosecuted in federal court for the criminal actions 
of any employee or agent, intended at least in part to benefit the corporation.2  
That superior standard makes corporations derivatively liable for the actions 
of agents. High-level employees need not have been involved in the wrongdoing 
or aware of it.  That said, for certain federal misdemeanors, under the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine, an executive or other responsible officer 
may be held criminally liable for a violation that the officer was not personally 
aware of.3  Due to that structure of the federal criminal corporate liability 
doctrine, it is often not known how often CEOs were themselves aware of 
                                                        
2 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 491–95 (1909). 
3 U.S. v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); U.S. v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
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corporate criminality.  Typically, prosecutors do not report which officers or 
employees were involved or aware of the misconduct.  Corporations do not 
typically report the results of their internal investigations, either.   
In some cases, if the CEO was personally involved and then subject to 
civil or criminal enforcement, it is certainly public information that the CEO 
committed a crime.  There are a few high-profile examples of this occurring.  
For example, the chairman and CEO of Halliburton personally met with 
Nigerian officials and arranged to pay bribes to secure a multi-billion-dollar 
contract, receiving a personal kickback, actions that later became the subject 
of FCPA prosecutions.4 Bernard Ebbers, former CEO of Worldcom, received a 
25 year sentence, a $30 million fine, and was ordered to transfer all of his 
assets to the court.5  However, CEOs are rarely prosecuted. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) policy has long emphasized that “[o]nly rarely should provable 
individual culpability not be pursued, particularly if it relates to high-level 
corporate officers.” 6   Yet of 306 deferred and non-prosecution agreements 
entered by federal prosecutors from 2001-2014, only 104 companies, or 34% 
had individuals prosecuted, and of those, only 26 were CEOs.  (Garrett, 2015, 
at 1791). In Fall 2015, DOJ revised guidelines for prosecution of organizations 
to emphasize the importance of investigating potentially culpable individuals 
in corporate cases. 7 
To be sure, civil enforcement may also substantially affect CEOs.  The 
Department of Health and Human Services, for example, has filed civil cases 
to exclude CEOs and other officers from participating in federal health care 
programs for time periods ranging from months to years to permanent 
exclusions, effectively making it impossible to continue in their positions. 
While very little work has examined executives at companies that have been 
criminal prosecuted, more studies have examined executives at companies that 
committed fraud, typically civil fraud.  One might predict that more serious 
criminal cases would affect executives and CEOs far more than mere civil 
enforcement actions.  We aimed to examine that question. Studies have found 
that when employees are identified as responsible parties by the SEC, they are 
highly likely to be fired and to face prosecution (Karpoff 2008). Studies have 
also found that when crimes are committed, firms are highly likely to fire 
employees even when they do not report the conduct to regulators (Healy, 
2016).  Whether those results extend to higher-up individuals and even CEOs, 
however is more equivocal.  One study has found that more senior executives 
face less severe internal discipline, as do male executives (Healy and Serafeim 
2016).  Moreover, the question also remains how often responsible employees 
                                                        
4 James Pinkerson, Former KBR Exec. Gets Prison Time in Nigerian Bribery Scheme, Hous. Chron. (Feb. 
23, 2012). 
5 Jennifer Bayot, Ebbers Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for $11 Billion Fraud, N.Y. Times (July 13, 
2005). 
6 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual §9-28.200 (2015), at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf. 
7 See id. 
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are identified internally by the corporation.  A few studies have found no 
differences in employment or turnover at firms found to have engaged in 
securities fraud.  For example, Beneish (1999) found no change in employment 
in firms that did manipulate earnings (also finding that the SEC was unlikely 
to disbar executives).  Another study by Agrawal at el. (1999) found companies 
charged with fraud did not have significantly higher turnover of senior 
managers or directors.  Each of those studies provide some reason to be 
skeptical whether corporate criminal prosecutions would result in CEO 
discipline in the form of turnover; whether CEO compensation would be 
affected is less clear from the literature. 
When CEO’s are held individually accountable, through criminal or civil 
actions, the company or its D&O insurers will typically bear the costs of legal 
fees for the defense, which may run in the tens of millions. A company can also 
choose to fire its CEO.  Its ability to do so may depend on the terms of the 
CEO’s contract.  The contracts typically state that a felony conviction is cause 
for termination, as well as gross misconduct or deliberate neglect of duties.  
However, the CEO may often not have been personally involved in the criminal 
conduct at issue; the company would have to show recklessness or deliberate 
neglect in supervision of those who committed the crimes.  It is rare for CEOs 
to challenge their dismissals, but when it does occur, the costs can be quite 
burdensome for the company. (Lublin, 2014) The larger costs to shareholder 
value of replacing a CEO, including severance, search costs, and transition 
costs to performance, can run in the billions.  (Karlsson, 2015). 
Corporate prosecutions can have multiple goals, including obtaining 
cooperation in prosecuting individual offenders, compensating victims, and 
deterring future crime, but also changing the governance of a company. Few 
corporate prosecution agreements call for replacement of a CEO or altering 
CEO compensation. One exception was the Bristol-Myers Squibb deferred 
prosecution agreement entered with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District 
of New Jersey, which required the company to separate the positions of CEO 
and chairman of the Board.  In 2006, following revelations of new misconduct, 
the independent monitor appointed by the federal prosecutor requested that 
the CEO be replaced.  More commonly, agreements require reporting of a chief 
compliance officer to the Board, or other changes designed to enhance the 
compliance function.  When pay is addressed, it is typically compensation of 
lower-level employees that may have had financial incentives to break the law, 
or provisions requiring claw-backs of bonuses for employees that break rules.  
Prosecution agreements have not addressed the compensation of high-level 
officers, much less CEOs.  Any changes to such compensation have not come at 
the direction of federal prosecutors. 
 
II. Data and Research Design 
  
A. Data Sources 
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The data concerning corporate prosecutions comes from a hand-collected 
set of data concerning corporations prosecuted from 2000 to 2014, by federal 
prosecutors, and which settled their cases through deferred and non-
prosecution agreements as well as plea agreements.  These data are 
maintained by Brandon Garrett and Jon Ashley, and are available online in a 
Corporate Prosecution Registry. 8   When public corporations are federally 
prosecuted they are typically not convicted. In the majority of cases, public 
corporations receive deferred or non-prosecution agreements.  (Garrett, 2014, 
62). Such an agreement permits the company to avoid an indictment and a 
conviction—there is no criminal record.  Deferred prosecution agreements are 
filed in a federal court, but upon filing, the parties agree to waive Speedy Trial 
Act rights.  If the company complies with the terms of the agreement, following 
a predetermined period of time usually two to three years, then the case is then 
dismissed from the judge’s docket.  (Garrett, 2014, 63).  Non-prosecution 
agreements are not filed in court, but consist in an agreement not to prosecute 
if the company follows through with the terms of the deal.  These agreements 
commonly impose criminal fines, other penalties, payments to victims using 
restitution or forfeiture payments, as well as terms requiring ongoing 
cooperation in investigations, imposition of corporate monitors, compliance 
programs, and other changes to governance.  (Garrett, 2014, 72-75).  Plea 
agreements are also entered with public companies, and a guilty plea brings 
with it a criminal conviction and typically some period of probation, including 
court-supervised probation if the judge is concerned with monitoring a 
company’s compliance.  Corporate prosecution agreements of all types are also 
commonly accompanied by civil enforcement and settlements with regulatory 
agencies.  (Garrett, 2014, 68). 
The corporations prosecuted and studied from this dataset were then 
examined in the Execucomp dataset, which has detailed compensation data for 
the top five highly paid officers in each firm.  There are 353 public companies 
in the Corporate Prosecution Registry (as of this writing), in cases brought 
from 1992 through 2018.  However, the intersection of Execucomp with our list 
of prosecuted companies yields a usable sample of 109 firms (see appendix A 
for a list of these firms along with the charges filed).9  For each firm, we 
examined executive pay and turnover for the three years prior to and following 
the year of prosecution.  We also have information about the type of crime that 
each firm was prosecuted for.  These crimes range widely from financial crimes 
                                                        
8 See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Corporate Prosecution Registry, at 
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/index.html. 
9 The full corporate prosecution data set contains 265 prosecutions among NYSE and NASDAQ firms in the 
2000-2014 period. Execucomp only covers firms that have been (currently or historically) in the S&P 1500 
index and a small number of additional firms (around 3,000 firms in total by 2017), with many firms not 
consistently covered over time. After merging the two data sets, 109 unique Execucomp firms can be linked 
to at least one prosecution in the sample period.  
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such as fraud, to bank secrecy act provisions, environmental violations, 
pharmaceutical regulations, international sanctions, and foreign bribery-
related crimes.  (Garrett, 2014, 64).  And finally, we also have hand-collected 
information about whether any executives were prosecuted, focusing here on 
CEOs.  For some companies, CEOs might turn over, but there may not be any 
prosecution of the CEO or other individuals.  Or one might imagine that the 
CEO might be prosecuted, but with charges eventually dropped and no 
turnover in the position. 
 
B. Research Design 
 
To examine the consequences of criminal prosecution of CEOs, we 
compared the patterns of CEO turnover and compensation of prosecuted firms 
to the other firms on the Execucomp database.  In other words, our research 
design can be viewed as akin to a difference-in-difference (DID) strategy.  To 
formalize the design, we first group firms into two categories: prosecuted firms 
and control firms.  Prosecuted firms are defined as public firms that were 
prosecuted by federal prosecutors for which we were able to collect at least one 
year of data both before and after the prosecutions.  Control firms are public 
firms on Execucomp without prosecutions in the sample period.  Firms that 
were prosecuted but do not have sufficient data to estimate the regressions 
discussed later are excluded from the sample.  
A challenge related to the use of a standard (DID) design is that we are 
ex ante uncertain about the ideal way to think about event time.  Specifically, 
the time window from the first revelation of criminal activities to prosecution 
and final settlement can potentially span several years and is not available in 
all cases.  If the board decides to penalize the CEO, the penalty may be 
observed at any of point in that window.  To deal with this challenge, we modify 
the standard DID specification by allowing the treatment status of a firm to 
interact with the year relative to prosecution year.  In particular, we estimate 
the following regression 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑘)𝑖,𝑡
3
𝑘=−2
+ 𝚪𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡       (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the outcome variable, such as turnover indicator or total pay. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑘)𝑖,𝑡 refers to a series of indicators of the 𝑘
𝑡ℎ year relative to the 
prosecution.  In other words, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑘)𝑖,𝑡equals 1 if and only if in year t, 
firm i is prosecuted in year t-k.  The only exception is 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(3) which 
equals one for not only the third year after prosecution but also subsequent 
years after the third.  We do not include indicators for observations three or 
more years prior to prosecution, as these observations serve as bench mark. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑘)𝑖,𝑡is always zero for firms that are never prosecuted. For firms 
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with multiple prosecutions, we code 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑘)𝑖,𝑡based on only the first 
prosecution for simplicity. Our main interest is 𝛽𝑘coefficients of the indicator 
variables. The coefficients tell us whether, conditional on firm and year effects, 
firms have more CEO turnover or lower CEO pay around prosecutions 
compared to three or more years prior to the prosecutions.  
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1is a vector of control variables, including book assets (in 
natural logarithm), book-to-market ratio, sales growth, CEO age, industry 
stock return and firm stock-returns.  All control variables are measured with 
one-year lag. 𝛿𝑖 and 𝜂𝑡 are firm fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively.  
Firm fixed effects help us control for unobserved time-invariant firm 
characteristics.  For example, a firm that operates in a risky environment may 
have both a high probability of prosecution and higher CEO turnover on 
average, even if there is no causal association between prosecution and CEO 
turnover.  Year fixed effects control for aggregate trends in CEO turnover and 
CEO pay in the sample period, such as the passage of FAS 123R that 
precipitated a preference for restricted stock relative to stock options in CEO 
pay. 
The specification in equation (1) represents a generalized difference-in-
difference design, where the coefficient is allowed to vary by the number of 
years relative to treatment time.  In other words, instead of examining the 
average change of turnover probability or compensation level, we examine how 
these variables evolve year over year relative to the year of the prosecution. 
This refinement provides two advantages.  First, assuming the CEO is 
penalized, we do not know ex ante when the actual penalty is imposed on the 
CEO.  Considering the years before the actual prosecution enables us to 
account for the possibility that the board holds the CEO accountable for the 
misbehavior even before the firm is prosecuted. Second, penalties in the form 
of a CEO firing or a pay cut, should they occur, are likely to be temporary.  
Even if we are willing to assume that penalties are imposed on the CEO after 
the prosecution, it is unlikely that the prosecuted firm would have persistently 
higher probability of turnover or a persistently lower level of pay after the 
prosecution.   
We use the difference-in-difference design because it directly answers 
our research question, i.e., whether prosecuted firms’ managers experience 
turnover/pay cut relative to those of not prosecuted firms. DID                                                
designs are also commonly used with experimental settings in the law and 
economics literature for causal interference. Since we do not see prosecutions 
as natural experiments, we do not claim the ability to make sharp causal 
inference from our results.  
That being said, it may be helpful to discuss the key identification 
assumption of DID, parallel trend, under our setting. The assumption states 
that the outcomes of the treated units and the control units should trend 
similarly if there is no treatment. Since the counterfactual outcomes cannot be 
observed, we cannot empirically verify the assumption. To alleviate the 
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concern that prosecuted firms and the control firms have different CEO 
turnover/pay trends in the absence of prosecution, we conduct a placebo test 
after the main analysis Section III. E. In addition, as will be discussed in 
Section III. B, we repeat the main test within the sample of prosecuted firms 
by exploiting the timing the prosecutions.  
 
III.  Results: Corporate Prosecutions, CEO Turnover, and CEO Compensation  
 
A. Descriptive Data 
 
Table 1 panel A presents the year in which 109 of the prosecuted firms 
appear.10  Viewing that list of companies, displayed in Appendix A, one can 
observe how the numbers of public companies prosecuted per year increases 
over the past decade.  The types of crimes for which public companies are 
prosecuted also changes, to some degree.  For example, FCPA or foreign bribery 
prosecutions become far more common after 2005.  Other types of prosecutions 
remain relatively uncommon for public companies, such as antitrust 
prosecutions and import/export related violations. 
 
                                                        
10 Since we only require each prosecuted firm to have at least one year of data both before and after the 
prosecution, not all prosecuted firms have data for the entire sample period. 
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Although the first prosecution in the sample took place in 2000, we start 
the sample period from 1998 to have sufficient observations to enable 
measurement of changes in turnover and pay before the prosecution. On 
average there are seven prosecutions per year, but the period from 2006 to 
2010 witnessed a much higher number (13 prosecutions per year). Prosecutions 
in the sample peak in 2007 (18 firms). 
Panel B shows the number of prosecuted firms and control firms in each 
industry.  The control sample consists of 2,801 firms leading to a total of 2,910 
firms.  The control sample spans from 1998 to 2014.  Pharmaceutical, oil and 
banking sectors have the highest number of prosecuted firms, whereas aircraft, 
agriculture and coal sectors have the highest percentage of prosecuted firms.   
Table 1
Panel A: Frequency of prosecution by year
2000 1 0.9%
2001 4 3.7%
2002 2 1.8%
2003 4 3.7%
2004 4 3.7%
2005 6 5.5%
2006 11 10.1%
2007 18 16.5%
2008 15 13.8%
2009 9 8.3%
2010 13 11.9%
2011 5 4.6%
2012 4 3.7%
2013 7 6.4%
2014 6 5.5%
Total 109 100.0%
Number of 
Prosecutions
PercentYear
This table presents summary statistics. Panel A shows the number of prosecutions in the sample in
each year. For each prosecuted firm, we only consider the first prosecution in the sample and ignore
repeated prosecutions. Panel B shows the number of prosecuted firms and control firms in each
industry. Prosecuted firms are defined as firms that were prosecuted and have at least one year of
data both before and after the prosecutions. Control firms are firms without prosecutions in the
sample period. Industries are grouped based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. Panel 3
presents the mean and median of CEO pay, CEO turnover rate and other firm characteristics for
prosecuted firms and control firms, respectively. The notation *, ** and *** in indicate statistically
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level in two-tailed t-tests, respectively. Panel D shows the average
CEO turnover rate and CEO pay of prosecuted firms in each year relative to each firm’s
prosecution. 
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The two figures below display trends of CEO turnover and total pay around prosecution. 
Panel A and B plot the average CEO turnover rate and CEO pay of prosecuted firms in 
each year relative to each firm’s prosecution, respectively. For each graph, the value at year 
-3 include the year at t-3 and before; the value at year 3 include the year at t+3 and after, 
where t indicates the prosecution year. 
 
Figure 1.  Average CEO turnover 
 
 
Panel B: Number of prosecuted and control firms by industry
AGRIC 5 2 7 29% HLTH 52 1 53 2%
AERO 12 3 15 20% COMPS 109 2 111 2%
COAL 6 1 7 14% BUSSV 326 4 330 1%
SHIPS 7 1 8 13% FIN 82 1 83 1%
OIL 109 13 122 11% CHIPS 165 2 167 1%
DRUGS 110 13 123 11% BEER 7 0 7 0%
CHEM 59 6 65 9% BLDMT 53 0 53 0%
FOOD 51 5 56 9% BOOKS 20 0 20 0%
LABEQ 49 4 53 8% BOXES 10 0 10 0%
OTHER 26 2 28 7% ELCEQ 30 0 30 0%
CNSTR 29 2 31 6% FABPR 4 0 4 0%
TRANS 73 4 77 5% FUN 33 0 33 0%
MACH 92 5 97 5% GOLD 10 0 10 0%
UTIL 122 6 128 5% GUNS 7 0 7 0%
WHLSL 83 4 87 5% MEALS 57 0 57 0%
INSUR 128 6 134 4% MINES 10 0 10 0%
BANKS 218 9 227 4% PAPER 43 0 43 0%
PERSV 30 1 31 3% RLEST 7 0 7 0%
RTAIL 171 5 176 3% RUBBR 14 0 14 0%
HSHLD 42 1 43 2% SMOKE 5 0 5 0%
MEDEQ 84 2 86 2% SODA 7 0 7 0%
TELCM 85 2 87 2% STEEL 50 0 50 0%
CLTHS 43 1 44 2% TOYS 12 0 12 0%
AUTOS 45 1 46 2% TXTLS 18 0 18 0%
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Figure 2.  Average CEO total pay 
 
 
Panel C presents the mean and median firm characteristics.  Prosecuted 
firms are, on average, larger than the control firms in terms of total assets.  
The average total book assets of prosecuted firms is $63 billion whereas that 
of the control firms is only $11 billion.  Consequently, the prosecuted firms 
have higher level of CEO pay than control firms on average given prior work 
that documents a strong association between pay level and firm size (e.g., 
Gabaix and Landier 2008). Despite the difference in average size, other 
characteristics between the two groups are marginally different from one 
another.   
6
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
1
4
0
0
0
C
E
O
 t
o
ta
l 
p
a
y
 (
$
1
0
0
0
)
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Year relative to prosecution
Average CEO total pay around prosecution
DO HEADS ROLL?   
 
 14 
 
 
Panel D shows the average CEO pay and turnover probability around 
prosecutions for prosecuted firms.  Figure 1 also presents these trends 
graphically.  Notably, the CEO turnover is at the prosecution year is 23.4% (25 
cases), which is almost twice as high as the unconditional average as shown in 
Panel C. For the prosecuted firms, the total number of CEO turnovers in each 
of the two years preceding prosecutions is 19 and 16, respectively. For each of 
the two years immediately after the prosecution year, the number is eight and 
six.  Turnovers are also more frequent than normal in the two years prior to 
the prosecution, and less frequent in the two years after prosecution. As will 
be discussed in detail later, only six CEOs are personally charged.   
 
 
 
However, this pattern should be interpreted with caution, because it is 
possible that both prosecution and CEO turnover are triggered by other factors 
Panel C: Characteristics of prosecuted and control firms
# Firm-Years Mean # Firm-Years Mean Difference
Total Pay ($1000) 1615 10505 26962 5126 5378 ***
Salary ($1000) 1615 1031 26962 715 316 ***
Bonus ($1000) 1615 2035 26962 965 1070 ***
Option ($1000) 1615 3212 26962 1788 1424 ***
Restricted Stock ($1000) 1615 3323 26962 1252 2070 ***
CEO Turnover 1615 0.13 26962 0.11 0.02 **
Total Assets ($M) 1615 65163 26962 11547 53616 ***
Log(Total Assets) 1615 9.22 26962 7.48 1.73 ***
Book-to-Market 1615 0.53 26962 0.54 -0.01 *
Return on Assets 1615 0.05 26962 0.05 0.01 ***
Sales Growth 1615 0.11 26962 0.12 -0.01 **
CEO Age 1579 56.1 25608 55.7 0.4 **
Stock Return 1615 0.15 26962 0.18 -0.03 *
Std. Dev of Return 1615 0.10 26962 0.12 -0.02 ***
Industry Return 1615 0.11 26962 0.11 0.00
Control FirmsProsecuted Firms 
Panel D: Average CEO turnover and pay around prosecution
T-3 or before 10.9% 10,605 926 1,645 4,157 2,773
T-2 17.8% 9,518 970 2,094 2,946 2,645
T-1 14.7% 9,394 978 2,361 2,403 3,140
T 23.4% 10,778 1,040 2,498 3,050 3,479
T+1 8.1% 10,234 1,094 1,809 2,507 3,691
T+2 6.7% 9,569 1,102 2,230 1,836 3,468
T+3 or after 11.8% 10,198 1,203 2,441 1,997 3,954
Restricted 
Stock
CEO 
Turnover 
Total Pay Salary Bonus Option
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unrelated to the question at hand, such as the 2008 financial crisis.  In terms 
of CEO pay, the patterns are far less clear.  The average total pay drops in the 
two years prior to prosecution (from $10,605,000 to $9,569,000), but rises in the 
prosecution year (to $10,778,000). Overall, the dollar amount of CEO total pay 
for prosecuted firms remained relatively stable around prosecutions. 
 
B. CEO outcomes in prosecuted firms 
 
Table 2 Panel A presents the results of estimating equation (1) with both 
prosecuted and control firms.  We begin with an examination of the pattern of 
CEO turnover in column 1.  The coefficient for Prosecution(k) is positive for k 
between -2 to 0 (from two years before the prosecution to prosecution year), but 
becomes negative for k greater 1 (after the prosecution year).  Notably, the 
estimated coefficient of Prosecution(0) is 0.107, indicating that, after 
controlling for firm characteristics and time trends, prosecuted firms are 
associated with a 10.7% increase in the frequency of CEO turnover in the year 
of prosecution. This increase is also economically significant, as the 
unconditional turnover probability is around 12%.   
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Although statistically insignificant, prosecuted firms also have a higher 
rate of CEO turnover in the two years before prosecution.  However, in the two 
years following the prosecution year, CEOs are less likely to be replaced.  This 
pattern is not surprising because we observe that prosecuted firms replace 
CEOs much more frequently in prosecution year and would hence be likely 
reluctant to change their CEO yet again in the following two years. If we 
assume that the propensity to fire CEO due to prosecution is accurately 
captured by incremental turnover rates in the prosecution year, then around 
10% of the boards are willing to fire CEOs when their firms are prosecuted. 
However, it is unclear whether the observed CEOs turnovers in the prosecution 
Table 2
Panel A: Whole sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turnover Total Pay (log) Salary (log) Bonus (log) Option (log) Stock (log)
Prosecution(-2) 0.055 -0.010 -0.182 -0.155 0.238 0.088
(1.30) (-0.13) (-1.60) (-0.53) (0.71) (0.25)
Prosecution(-1) 0.021 -0.069 -0.143 0.052 0.079 0.136
(0.56) (-0.86) (-1.49) (0.19) (0.23) (0.40)
Prosecution(0) 0.107** 0.031 -0.006 0.441 0.739* 0.013
(2.37) (0.31) (-0.10) (1.47) (1.78) (0.03)
Prosecution(1) -0.036 -0.052 0.012 -0.104 0.486 -0.077
(-1.17) (-0.52) (0.20) (-0.29) (1.17) (-0.19)
Prosecution(2) -0.054* -0.063 -0.096 0.051 -0.207 -0.127
(-1.70) (-0.56) (-1.01) (0.13) (-0.44) (-0.28)
Prosecution(3+) -0.011 -0.107 -0.051 0.150 0.537 0.178
(-0.56) (-1.19) (-0.91) (0.50) (1.19) (0.51)
Total Assets (log) 0.015*** 0.253*** 0.147*** -0.085 0.332*** 0.416***
(3.01) (12.20) (7.75) (-1.56) (4.53) (5.83)
Book-to-Market 0.023*** -0.179*** -0.028 -0.210*** -0.467*** -0.151**
(2.78) (-6.79) (-1.09) (-2.89) (-5.61) (-2.00)
ROA -0.237*** 0.668*** 0.309*** 0.998*** 0.772*** 1.045***
(-7.79) (6.86) (4.43) (4.19) (2.56) (3.71)
Sales Growth -0.027*** 0.070** 0.011 -0.059 0.262*** -0.317***
(-3.05) (2.16) (0.52) (-0.81) (2.79) (-4.04)
Industry Return 0.025** 0.088*** 0.026 0.527*** -0.014 0.108
(1.97) (3.13) (1.22) (6.00) (-0.13) (1.23)
Firm Return -0.020*** 0.108*** 0.016** 0.258*** 0.059 0.105***
(-4.87) (8.14) (1.97) (8.31) (1.48) (3.19)
Fixed effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Standard error clustering Firm level Firm level Firm level Firm level Firm level Firm level
Adj. R-squared 0.010 0.648 0.587 0.377 0.427 0.497
Number of observations 28577 28577 28577 28577 28577 28577
Number of firms 2919 2919 2919 2919 2919 2919
This table examines the pattern of CEO turnover and CEO pay around prosecution by regressing CEO turnover or CEO pay on
prosecution indicators and control variables. For both Panel A and Panel B, from Column (1) to (6), the outcome variable is CEO
turnover indicator, total pay, salary, bonus, option grant value and restricted stock grant value, respectively. Prosecution(k) are a series of
indicators of the k t^h year relative to the prosecution. Control variables include book assets (in natural logarithm), book-to-market ratio,
return on assets, sales growth, industry stock return and firm stock return. All control variables are measured with one year lag. All
models also include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix. Panel A shows the results of
estimating equation (1) using both prosecuted firms and control firms. Panel B presents the results from using prosecuted firms only. All
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Two-tailed t-statistics are shown in parentheses. The notation *, ** and *** in indicate
statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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year are (i) forced or voluntary; and (ii) are causally linked.  It is possible that 
CEOs voluntarily resign to avoid public scrutiny. 
 In columns 2-6, we change the outcome variable to CEO total pay and 
its four major components: salary, bonus, dollar value of option grants and 
restricted stock grants (TDC1 from the Execucomp database).  We measure 
pay variables using the natural log of one plus the dollar amount of pay.  
Surprisingly, we do not find strong evidence for pay cuts around prosecution 
across all pay variables. 
 One potential concern about the results related to the full sample is that 
we have many more control firms than prosecuted firms, and further, that the 
two groups may differ in both observable and unobservable ways.  To respond 
to this concern, we estimate the same regressions for the subsample of the 109 
prosecuted firms only.  Every firm has been prosecuted at some point in this 
subsample.  Hence, the variation in the Prosecution(k) variable is attributable 
entirely to the timing of the prosecution.  Table 2 Panel B presents the results, 
which are similar to the results in Panel A.  That is, while we find an increase 
in CEO turnover in the year of the prosecution, we do not find any consistent 
change in the compensation for the CEOs around the prosecution year. 
 
 
Panel B: Prosecuted firms only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turnover Total Pay (log) Salary (log) Bonus (log) Option (log) Stock (log)
Prosecution(-2) 0.059 -0.062 -0.037 0.120 0.353 -0.184
(1.28) (-0.79) (-0.30) (0.39) (1.08) (-0.52)
Prosecution(-1) 0.031 -0.125 0.050 0.465 0.288 -0.237
(0.69) (-1.26) (0.42) (1.43) (0.75) (-0.56)
Prosecution(0) 0.121** -0.032 0.218 0.944** 1.068** -0.429
(2.21) (-0.24) (1.15) (2.22) (2.16) (-0.91)
Prosecution(1) -0.021 -0.114 0.271 0.538 0.932 -0.556
(-0.50) (-0.90) (1.24) (1.01) (1.58) (-1.00)
Prosecution(2) -0.046 -0.111 0.220 0.828 0.329 -0.593
(-1.03) (-0.72) (0.97) (1.56) (0.48) (-0.89)
Prosecution(3+) 0.013 -0.171 0.360 1.235** 1.345 -0.416
(0.28) (-1.12) (1.42) (2.03) (1.63) (-0.57)
Total Assets (log) 0.027 0.019 0.189*** -0.078 0.050 0.355
(1.40) (0.20) (3.58) (-0.32) (0.21) (1.28)
Book-to-Market 0.020 -0.312*** -0.274* -0.744** -1.002** 0.050
(0.65) (-2.82) (-1.84) (-2.15) (-2.56) (0.13)
ROA -0.514*** 1.280*** 0.489** -0.262 1.286 -0.695
(-3.45) (3.73) (2.25) (-0.21) (1.04) (-0.46)
Sales Growth 0.038 0.165* 0.129 -0.097 0.632* -0.245
(0.82) (1.68) (0.79) (-0.26) (1.72) (-0.67)
Industry Return 0.015 0.066 -0.002 0.874** -0.060 -0.079
(0.25) (0.59) (-0.03) (2.35) (-0.12) (-0.15)
Firm Return -0.015 0.141** 0.005 0.230 0.181 0.224
(-0.55) (2.40) (0.11) (1.51) (0.91) (1.00)
Fixed effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Standard error clustering Firm level Firm level Firm level Firm level Firm level Firm level
Adj. R-squared -0.004 0.683 0.672 0.279 0.384 0.445
Number of observations 1615 1615 1615 1615 1615 1615
Number of firms 109 109 109 109 109 109
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 Because of the higher than usual level of CEO turnover around the 
prosecution, it is possible that the variation in CEO pay around prosecutions 
are driven by CEO turnover.  Therefore, it is interesting to separately examine 
firms with CEO turnover around the prosecution year and the firms without 
such turnover.  Firms without CEO turnover are particularly interesting for 
two reasons.  First, conditional on the knowledge that the CEO is not fired, the 
penalty to the CEO, if any, potentially takes the form of a pay cut.  Second, the 
pay variables for the same CEO are more comparable from year to year, 
potentially making the tests more powerful.  
 Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation 1 after partitioning 
the prosecuted firms based on whether or not the prosecutions were 
accompanied by CEO turnover.  In panel A, we remove the prosecuted firms 
that had CEO turnover in the three-year window (T+1, T, T-1) around 
prosecution.  In other words, the sample consists of control firms and 
prosecuted firms without CEO turnover around prosecution.  We use the same 
set of five CEO turnover/pay outcome variables, as in Table 2.  Overall, the 
results are similar to those reported in Table 2 Panel A.  That is, we do not find 
evidence of a CEO pay cut when the CEOs are not replaced around 
prosecutions.  In panel B, we retain control firms and prosecuted firms that 
experienced CEO turnover around the prosecution.  This is a potentially less 
interesting group because the CEO pay outcome variables are likely driven by 
new compensation contracts of the incoming CEO.  There is no consistent 
evidence of a pay cut in this sub-sample either.  However, both the absolute 
magnitude of estimated coefficient and estimated standard errors are larger in 
this sub-sample, consistent with the noisy nature of pay changes around CEO 
turnover.    
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Table 3
Panel A: No CEO turnover group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Pay (log) Salary (log) Bonus (log) Option (log) Stock (log)
Prosecution(-2) -0.103 -0.142 -0.135 -0.295 0.199
(-1.02) (-0.99) (-0.37) (-0.67) (0.47)
Prosecution(-1) -0.059 -0.096 0.478 -0.054 0.503
(-0.64) (-0.68) (1.54) (-0.12) (1.23)
Prosecution(0) 0.011 0.041 0.344 0.474 0.201
(0.11) (0.79) (1.09) (0.90) (0.43)
Prosecution(1) -0.002 0.029 -0.073 0.445 0.253
(-0.02) (0.48) (-0.17) (0.88) (0.53)
Prosecution(2) -0.025 0.022 0.110 -0.426 0.128
(-0.24) (0.35) (0.25) (-0.74) (0.23)
Prosecution(3+) -0.155 -0.035 0.130 0.328 0.033
(-1.57) (-0.49) (0.41) (0.58) (0.08)
Total Assets (log) 0.259*** 0.145*** -0.076 0.344*** 0.424***
(12.53) (7.53) (-1.39) (4.64) (5.88)
Book-to-Market -0.174*** -0.014 -0.180** -0.448*** -0.172**
(-6.67) (-0.58) (-2.49) (-5.40) (-2.27)
ROA 0.650*** 0.315*** 1.040*** 0.814*** 1.040***
(6.62) (4.47) (4.34) (2.68) (3.66)
Sales Growth 0.067** 0.000 -0.063 0.246*** -0.314***
(2.03) (0.02) (-0.86) (2.57) (-3.95)
Industry Return 0.086*** 0.029 0.534*** -0.006 0.099
(3.01) (1.35) (6.03) (-0.06) (1.12)
Firm Return 0.108*** 0.018** 0.264*** 0.063 0.101***
(8.12) (2.35) (8.46) (1.57) (3.06)
Fixed effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Standard error clustering Firm level Firm level Firm level Firm level Firm level
Adj. R-squared 0.646 0.586 0.380 0.426 0.499
Number of observations 27991 27991 27991 27991 27991
Number of firms 2877 2877 2877 2877 2877
This table examines the pattern of CEO turnover and CEO pay around prosecution, after partitioning prosecuted
firms based on whether the prosecutions were accompanied by CEO turnover. For both Panel A and Panel B, from
Column (1) to (5), the outcome variable is CEO total pay, salary, bonus, option grant value and restricted stock grant
value, respectively. Prosecution(k) are a series of indicators of the k t^h year relative to the prosecution. Control
variables include book assets (in natural logarithm), book-to-market ratio, return on assets, sales growth, industry
stock return and firm stock return. All control variables are measured with one year lag. All models also include firm
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Panel A shows the results of estimating equation (1) using both prosecuted firms
and control firms, excluding prosecuted firms with CEO turnover in the three-year window (T-1, T, T+1) around the
prosecutions. Panel B presents the results after excluding prosecuted firms without CEO turnover in the three-year
window (T-1, T, T+1) around the prosecutions. Panel C shows average CEO pay around prosecution for firms that
replaced CEO in the prosecution year. The post-prosecution pay variables reflect the compensation to the “old”
CEOs replaced in the prosecution year, after they were replaced. Panel D examine the compensation for the
replaced CEO around prosecution. The sample consists of 25 prosecuted firms that replaced their CEOs in the
prosecution year and all control firms. For prosecuted firms, the pay variables after prosecution reflects the
compensation to the “old” CEO replaced in the prosecution year, after they were replaced. Observations for CEOs
appointed after prosecution are excluded from the sample. All variables are defined in Appendix. All standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. Two-tailed t-statistics are shown in parentheses. The notation *, ** and *** in indicate
statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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 To shed more light on how CEO pay changes when prosecutions are 
accompanied by CEO turnovers, we focus on the 25 firms that replaced CEO 
in the year of prosecution (see appendix B).  For these firms, we investigate the 
compensation of the replaced CEO around prosecution.  Out of the 25 replaced 
CEOs, the Execucomp database reports compensation data in the year of 
prosecution (i.e. the first year they step down) for 16 of the CEOs. Only two of 
the replaced CEOs have compensation data after the year in which their firms 
were prosecuted.  (We note that we did not study the subsequent careers of 
CEO’s that left a firm, at any new employment they obtained). 
 
 
 
In Table 3 Panel C, we compare the average pay of the replaced CEO in 
the prosecution year to previous years.  We modify our firm-year panels in the 
following steps.  First, we extract the 25 firms that have CEO turnover in the 
prosecution year.  For these firms, we base the pay variables in and after 
Panel B: CEO turnover group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Pay (log) Salary (log) Bonus (log) Option (log) Stock (log)
Prosecution(-2) 0.146 -0.254 -0.191 1.121** -0.083
(1.41) (-1.39) (-0.40) (2.31) (-0.13)
Prosecution(-1) -0.080 -0.227** -0.641 0.313 -0.446
(-0.54) (-2.23) (-1.27) (0.68) (-0.78)
Prosecution(0) 0.068 -0.091 0.583 1.182* -0.290
(0.33) (-0.82) (0.98) (1.77) (-0.40)
Prosecution(1) -0.136 -0.025 -0.174 0.546 -0.637
(-0.65) (-0.20) (-0.27) (0.75) (-0.88)
Prosecution(2) -0.139 -0.343 -0.081 0.203 -0.603
(-0.52) (-1.35) (-0.11) (0.25) (-0.80)
Prosecution(3+) -0.012 -0.091 0.167 0.907 0.494
(-0.07) (-1.08) (0.27) (1.27) (0.86)
Total Assets (log) 0.261*** 0.147*** -0.094* 0.336*** 0.412***
(12.48) (7.49) (-1.68) (4.46) (5.64)
Book-to-Market -0.175*** -0.025 -0.207*** -0.451*** -0.144*
(-6.44) (-0.97) (-2.79) (-5.33) (-1.88)
ROA 0.664*** 0.304*** 1.017*** 0.728** 1.087***
(6.69) (4.27) (4.22) (2.37) (3.81)
Sales Growth 0.067** 0.015 -0.049 0.261*** -0.327***
(2.04) (0.70) (-0.67) (2.71) (-4.12)
Industry Return 0.091*** 0.024 0.500*** -0.018 0.127
(3.15) (1.12) (5.59) (-0.17) (1.43)
Firm Return 0.107*** 0.015* 0.254*** 0.054 0.104***
(7.97) (1.82) (8.09) (1.34) (3.14)
Fixed effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Standard error clustering Firm level Firm level Firm level Firm level Firm level
Adj. R-squared 0.641 0.578 0.378 0.427 0.497
Number of observations 27548 27548 27548 27548 27548
Number of firms 2852 2852 2852 2852 2852
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prosecution year on the “old” CEOs (i.e. those replaced in the prosecution year). 
The specific firm-year stream stops when the “old” CEO no longer has pay 
information, which usually happens right after the prosecution year. CEOs 
appointed in and after prosecution year are excluded from the sample.  
Surprisingly, the level of pay in the prosecution year is not much lower than 
the previous two years.  This suggests that CEOs who are replaced around 
prosecution continue to receive sizable compensation (e.g., severance pay) in 
the year that they step down.11  
 
 
   
In Panel D, we combine the modified 25 firms with the control firms and 
regress total pay on prosecution year indicator (Prosecution(0)) and control 
variables.  The coefficient on prosecution year indicator is negative but not 
statistically significant.  Together with Panel C, there is no evidence for 
significant drop in pay when the CEOs are placed when the firms are 
prosecuted. 
 
                                                        
11 The data does not separately report severance pay from the rest. 
Panel C: Average pay for CEOs replaced in the prosecution year
T-3 or before 11,605 812 1,189 3,005 5,454 310
T-2 8,002 896 1,119 2,843 2,342 205
T-1 6,045 840 1,089 1,355 2,151 299
T 10,847 510 667 2,578 5,080 1,925
Other PayTotal Pay Salary Bonus Option
Restricted 
Stock
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C. Criminally Charged CEOs 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is hard to ascertain whether the fired CEOs in 
our sample were forced to step down in connection with the prosecution or 
whether they were replaced for unrelated reasons.  One way to shed some light 
on this question is to identify CEOs who were individually charged by 
prosecutors with having committed federal crimes.  Six of the 109 firms in our 
sample are associated with CEOs who were specifically charged in criminal 
cases related to the case that the corporation resolved in a prosecution 
Panel D: CEO turnover around firm prosecution and CEO prosecution
(1)
Turnover
Prosecution(-2) 0.055
(1.29)
Prosecution(-2)*Charged 0.014
(0.06)
Prosecution(-1) 0.021
(0.56)
Prosecution(-1)*Charged 0.009
(0.05)
Prosecution(0) 0.103**
(2.24)
Prosecution(0)*Charged 0.088
(0.41)
Prosecution(1) -0.049
(-1.63)
Prosecution(1)*Charged 0.228
(1.11)
Prosecution(2) -0.045
(-1.34)
Prosecution(2)*Charged -0.118**
(-2.53)
Prosecution(3) -0.010
(-0.51)
Prosecution(3)*Charged 0.008
(0.12)
Control variables Yes
Fixed effects Firm, Year
Standard error clustering Firm level
Adj. R-squared 0.0103
Number of observations 28577
Number of firms 2919
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agreement (Computer Associates, Halliburton Company, Sotheby's Holdings 
Inc., Alpha Natural Resources, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, and Wellcare 
Health Plans, Inc.).  Two companies fired such charged CEOs in the year in 
which the firm was prosecuted (Sanjay Kumar of Computer Associates and 
Diana Brooks of Sotheby Holdings). One company fired a charged CEO in the 
year after the year of the prosecution (Heath Schiesser of Wellcare). 
 Panel C of Table 3 presents compensation data for the two CEOs who 
were replaced in the year of the prosecution.  As can be seen, total pay falls in 
the year leading up to the prosecution of the firm and the replacement of the 
CEO.  The decline in pay is primarily attributable to lower levels of equity 
grants (both stock and options) presumably driven by a declining stock price of 
such firms.  Interestingly, salary and bonus remain more or less unchanged in 
the years leading up to the prosecution.  In the year of the prosecution, total 
pay actually goes up relative to the previous years.  A closer look at the 
composition of pay reveals interesting patterns.  Although salary and bonus 
fall, we observe an increase in the level of option grants, restricted stock grants 
and “other pay” in the year of the prosecution. The increase of equity pay and 
“other pay” are likely parts of the severance package for the departing CEO.  
  
Next, we compare the compensation and turnover patterns of CEOs 
whose firms have been prosecuted with those of CEOs who were specifically 
charged.  To do so, we define an indicator variable labelled “prosecuted CEO” 
that is set to one if the CEO has been charged.  We interact the “prosecuted 
CEO” dummy with the “Prosecution” indicator.  As shown in Panel D, we find 
that when the CEOs are prosecuted, their turnover is higher but not 
statistically significant.    
Turning to CEO pay, in Panel E of Table 3, when we include the 
interaction between “Prosecuted” and “Prosecuted CEO” in the CEO pay 
regression for replaced CEOs, the prosecuted CEOs experience a big and 
significant drop in total pay in the prosecution year.  This data suggests, that 
relative to the CEOs of firms that were prosecuted, individually charged CEOs 
of firms that were prosecuted suffer a significant cut in compensation. 
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D.  Forced vs. Voluntary Turnover 
 
In Table 2, we document a spike of CEO turnover in the year of 
prosecution. However, it is unclear whether the incremental turnovers are 
forced or voluntary. On the one hand, it is natural to expect that board 
members fire CEOs for the poor management that led to prosecutions; on the 
other hand, CEOs may voluntarily quit or switch jobs to avoid direct 
responsibility or additional reputational penalty. To investigate the nature of 
the CEO turnovers around prosecution, we classify CEO turnovers into two 
groups, forced and voluntary, based on the data shared by Jenter and Kanaan 
(1) (2)
Total Pay (log) Total Pay (log)
Prosecution(-2) 0.182 0.076
(1.01) (0.43)
Prosecution(-2)*Charged 0.286
(1.04)
Prosecution(-1) -0.230 -0.117
(-1.11) (-0.60)
Prosecution(-1)*Charged -2.341***
(-11.91)
Prosecution(0) -0.312 -0.009
(-0.79) (-0.02)
Prosecution(0)*Charged -3.354***
(-7.94)
Total Assets (log) 0.270*** 0.269***
(12.93) (12.90)
Book-to-Market -0.169*** -0.169***
(-6.31) (-6.31)
ROA 0.654*** 0.654***
(6.56) (6.55)
Sales Growth 0.063* 0.063*
(1.88) (1.90)
Industry Return 0.090*** 0.090***
(3.10) (3.11)
Firm Return 0.107*** 0.107***
(7.98) (7.99)
Fixed effects Firm, Year Firm, Year
Standard error clustering Firm level Firm level
Adj. R-squared 0.637 0.638
Number of observations 27187 27187
Number of firms 2835 2835
Panel E: Compensation for the replaced CEOs around prosecution
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(2015) and Peters and Wagner (2014). Since this turnover data stops at 2010, 
we use the observations prior to 2010 in our sample for this analysis. 
Table 4 presents the results. In the first column, we estimate equation 
(1) with total turnover, and confirm our turnover results holds for this period. 
In the next column, we switch the outcome variable to forced turnover, and 
find forced turnovers increase by 6.6% in the prosecution years.12 In the third 
column, we do not find similar result for voluntarily turnovers. However, we 
find that voluntarily turnovers are relatively rare in the two years following 
prosecutions. Overall, the results indicate that forced turnovers are primarily 
responsible for the turnover spike in the prosecution years.      
 
                                                        
12 This estimate is likely attenuated because not all CEO turnovers have forced/voluntary 
classification and we cannot use unclassified CEO turnovers in column (2) and (3). 
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E.  Placebo Test 
 
To further validate that our results are driven by prosecutions, we 
conduct the following placebo test. For each actually prosecuted firm, a pseudo 
prosecution is randomly placed in the firm's time series. We then estimate 
Table 4
(1) (2) (3)
Total Turnover Forced Turnover Voluntary Turnover
Prosecution(-2) 0.049 0.027 0.022
(1.05) (1.01) (0.56)
Prosecution(-1) 0.028 0.038 -0.009
(0.67) (1.33) (-0.28)
Prosecution(0) 0.099* 0.066* 0.032
(1.89) (1.89) (0.76)
Prosecution(1) -0.054 0.001 -0.055**
(-1.56) (0.04) (-2.05)
Prosecution(2) -0.031 0.032 -0.063**
(-0.71) (0.89) (-2.48)
Prosecution(3+) 0.005 -0.019 0.024
(0.14) (-0.78) (0.77)
Total Assets (log) 0.019*** 0.002 0.017***
(2.99) (0.56) (3.04)
Book-to-Market 0.029*** 0.031*** -0.002
(3.00) (4.12) (-0.25)
ROA -0.211*** -0.139*** -0.072**
(-6.13) (-6.52) (-2.48)
Sales Growth -0.031*** -0.009* -0.021**
(-3.05) (-1.69) (-2.35)
Industry Return 0.031** 0.016** 0.015
(2.26) (2.11) (1.27)
Firm Return -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.005
(-4.02) (-5.16) (-1.25)
Fixed effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Standard error clustering Firm level Firm level Firm level
Adj. R-squared 0.004 0.003 0.000
Number of observations 21920 21920 21920
Number of firms 2836 2836 2836
This table shows the pattern of total, forced and voluntary CEO turnovers around prosecutions. The
forced/voluntary classification is based on Jenter and Kanaan (2015) and Peters and Wagner (2014). From
Column (1) to (3), the outcome variable is total CEO turnover, forced CEO turnover and voluntary CEO turnover,
respectively. Prosecution(k) is a series of indicators of the k
th
year relative to the prosecutions. Control variables
include book assets (in natural logarithm), book-to-market ratio, return on assets, sales growth, industry stock
return and firm stock return. All control variables are measured with one year lag. All models also include firm
fixed effects and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix. All standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. Two-tailed t-statistics are shown in parentheses. The notation *, ** and *** in indicate statistically
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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equation (1) using the pseudo prosecution instead of actual prosecutions. If, as 
hypothesized, it is the prosecution that drive the spike in CEO turnover, we 
expect the placebo test to deliver very different results. If the incremental CEO 
turnovers stem from unobserved differences between prosecuted firms and the 
rest, then the placebo test should roughly replicate the findings in Table 2. For 
CEO pay regressions, since we do not reject the null hypothesis that 
prosecution does not affect CEO pay, the placebo test is less informative.    
As shown in Table 5, the placebo tests give very different results for the 
CEO turnover regression. None of the pseudo prosecution variable predicts 
CEO turnover, implying that it is the timing of actual prosecution that leads 
to the observed increase in turnover in Table 2. Similarly, pseudo prosecutions 
do not predict any of the CEO pay variables. Overall, the results from the 
placebo tests suggest that our main findings are not contaminated by 
unobserved characteristics that could affect CEO turnover or pay trends.   
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Conclusion 
 
Heads do not often roll at public corporations.  When a public 
corporation is criminally prosecuted, heads roll only modestly more than 
otherwise.  We found that in the year that the company settles a federal 
criminal prosecution, through a guilty plea or a deferred or non-prosecution 
agreement, there is a significantly higher level of CEO turnover. At the same 
time, we did not find evidence of any CEO pay cut, including because of possible 
severance compensation for departing CEOs.  We examined whether these 
Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turnover Total Pay (log) Salary (log) Bonus (log) Option (log) Stock (log)
Prosecution(-2) 0.008 0.049 -0.047 -0.202 0.043 0.240
(0.18) (0.64) (-0.55) (-0.61) (0.11) (0.63)
Prosecution(-1) 0.025 0.126 -0.068 0.155 0.373 0.528
(0.57) (1.45) (-0.77) (0.60) (0.97) (1.36)
Prosecution(0) 0.014 0.090 -0.064 0.112 0.073 0.165
(0.34) (1.09) (-0.73) (0.35) (0.17) (0.42)
Prosecution(1) -0.038 0.026 -0.070 0.241 -0.194 0.062
(-1.17) (0.31) (-0.77) (0.83) (-0.43) (0.15)
Prosecution(2) -0.002 0.160* -0.077 0.201 0.534 0.598
(-0.05) (1.91) (-0.80) (0.66) (1.14) (1.40)
Prosecution(3+) -0.003 -0.030 -0.143 0.030 0.531 0.404
(-0.15) (-0.35) (-1.59) (0.09) (1.06) (1.15)
Total Assets (log) 0.015*** 0.253*** 0.147*** -0.085 0.331*** 0.415***
(3.07) (12.24) (7.74) (-1.55) (4.53) (5.82)
Book-to-Market 0.023*** -0.180*** -0.027 -0.209*** -0.466*** -0.152**
(2.77) (-6.78) (-1.07) (-2.86) (-5.61) (-2.01)
ROA -0.236*** 0.668*** 0.310*** 0.999*** 0.774*** 1.044***
(-7.77) (6.85) (4.44) (4.20) (2.57) (3.71)
Sales Growth -0.027*** 0.069** 0.011 -0.059 0.262*** -0.317***
(-3.06) (2.14) (0.52) (-0.81) (2.77) (-4.05)
Industry Return 0.025** 0.088*** 0.025 0.526*** -0.015 0.110
(1.98) (3.14) (1.18) (5.99) (-0.15) (1.25)
Firm Return -0.020*** 0.107*** 0.016** 0.258*** 0.059 0.105***
(-4.90) (8.12) (2.01) (8.31) (1.48) (3.18)
Fixed effects Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year Firm, Year
Standard error clusteringFirm level Firm level Firm level Firm level Firm level Firm level
Adj. R-squared 0.010 0.648 0.587 0.377 0.427 0.497
Number of observations 28577 28577 28577 28577 28577 28577
Number of firms 2919 2919 2919 2919 2919 2919
This table shows the results of placebo tests based on randomly generated peudo-prosecutions. For each actually prosecuted firm, a pseudo-
prosecution is randomly placed in the firm's time series with equal probability. From Column (1) to (6), the outcome variable is CEO turnover
indicator, total pay, salary, bonus, option grant value and restricted stock grant value, respectively. Prosecution(k) is a series of indicators of the
k
th
year relative to the pseudo prosecutions. Control variables include book assets (in natural logarithm), book-to-market ratio, return on assets,
sales growth, industry stock return and firm stock return. All control variables are measured with one year lag. All models also include firm
fixed effects and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Two-tailed t-
statistics are shown in parentheses. The notation *, ** and *** in indicate statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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were forced or voluntary CEO departures and concluded that the departures 
were largely forced.   
Second, for the prosecuted firms that did not have CEO turnover after 
prosecution, there is no evidence of any reduction in compensation. Indeed, we 
observed a spike in CEO bonuses in the year of prosecution.  These findings 
confirm concerns expressed by judges, prosecutors, lawmakers, and academics 
that corporate prosecutions do not sufficiently impact high-level decision-
makers like CEOs.  Third, in contrast, for the prosecuted firms that did have 
CEO turnover after prosecution, there is evidence of a pay cut, both to salary 
and bonus, prior to the replacement of the CEO.  We also observe that relative 
to the CEOs of firms that were prosecuted, individually charged CEOs of firms 
that were prosecuted suffer a significant cut in compensation. 
These data describe for the first time how corporate prosecutions affect 
CEOs, and these results add to the literature on corporate criminal liability in 
several ways.  There is some literature on how corporate prosecutions affect 
the reputation and share price of a public company, but very little literature 
on how CEOs or other high-level officers are themselves affected by crimes.  
More broadly, there is very little literature on how corporate prosecutions 
affects governance or the incentives of internal actors.  While the penalty 
amounts are public, and descriptions of required governance changes can be 
read in settlement documents, we often know very little about what a company 
does in response internally.  Criminal prosecutions are not frequent and they 
reflect, one would hope, the most serious possible violations.  And yet we know 
very little about whether companies hold top-level officials accountable in 
response.  We do know that those top-level officials are rarely themselves 
prosecuted.  (Garrett, 2015).  That makes internal accountability within the 
firm all the more important. 
These results raise questions whether federal prosecutors targeting the 
most serious corporate crimes sufficiently incentivize accountability at the top.  
Few prosecution agreements contain terms regarding high-level leadership or 
compensation.  Yet to the extent that prosecutors and other enforcers consider 
questions of corporate governance, they appear more interested in individual 
criminal accountability, including of higher-up officers. Fall 2015 revisions to 
the Department of Justice organizational prosecution guidelines made a new 
focus on individual accountability clear.  At the time, Deputy Attorney General 
Sally Yates emphasized that justice is not served if prosecutors merely convict 
“the vice president in charge of going to jail.”13  However, it remains to be seen 
whether CEOs will actually be targeted in any meaningful numbers.  Absent 
criminal prosecutions of the CEOs, which seem likely to occur in only small 
numbers of cases, the question will remain whether corporations will 
themselves hold leadership accountable for serious corporate crimes.  These 
results suggest that internal mechanisms such as replacement of the CEO and 
                                                        
13 Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Dept. Sets Its Sights on Executives, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 10, 2015, at A1, http://nyti.ms/1UI3xfX.  
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reducing CEO compensation do not currently provide much added 
accountability for corporate crimes.  While similar results had been observed 
regarding civil fraud enforcement, one might have expected more observable 
internal corporate consequences when criminal enforcement occurs. 
These results suggest several avenues for potential future work.  This 
research raises questions about the role of CEOs and their relative insulation 
from consequences for serious breakdowns in corporate behavior.  Both the 
protection from firing and stability of compensation suggests the need for 
further work to examine how and why these norms of insulation of CEOs from 
accountability have developed.  It could be the case that what explains these 
results is that there is some consensus among public companies that CEO’s are 
not to blame for crimes that are committed under their watch and that others 
are more primarily responsible and best positioned to prevent corporate 
crimes.  If so, we would want to know far more about how those others deemed 
responsible are held accountable.   
Thus, a separate line of further work could examine whether others 
within a firm apart from CEO’s are held accountable to a greater degree, apart 
from any criminal prosecution of those individuals.  For example, additional 
forms of internal sanctions or industry sanctions might affect the careers of 
individuals involved in corporate crimes.  Corporations could be concluding 
that top-level officials are not to blame but only mid-level managers or lower-
level employees.  Further work could examine the accountability of corporate 
board members. Perhaps compliance officers or other gatekeepers who should 
have detected and reported the criminality face more severe internal 
consequences.  Perhaps other measure of turnover within firms could help one 
to assess the effect of a prosecution on internal culture or at least the stability 
of employment.  Or, such inquiry could uncover that neither CEO’s nor others 
within a company are held accountable internally, absent external government 
enforcement. 
We hope that this examination of the relative non-impact of criminal 
prosecutions on CEOs will help to stimulate further inquiry into the utility of 
corporate criminal prosecutions and into the role of CEO’s in modern public 
corporations. 
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Appendix A: List of Public Firms that were Prosecuted between 2000-2014 
 
DO HEADS ROLL?   
 
 34 
 
Company Name Prosecution Year Crime
Sotheby's Holdings Inc. 2000 Antitrust
Kaydon Corp. 2001 False statements
Macdermid Inc. 2001 Environmental - Clean Water Act
Nash-Finch Co., Inc. 2001 Food
Sears 2001 Fraud
Ashland Inc. 2002 Environmental
Carnival Co. 2002 Environmental
Banco Popular De Puerto Rico 2003 Bank Secrecy Act
Merrill Lynch 2003 Bank Secrecy Act
PNC Financial 2003 Securities Fraud
Tyson Foods Inc. 2003 FCPA
AOL 2004 Securities Fraud
Computer Associates 2004 Securities Fraud
Crompton Corp. 2004 Antitrust
GE Funding Capital Market Services, Inc. 2004 Antitrust
Bank of New York 2005 Bank Secrecy Act
Bristol-Myers Squibb 2005 Securities Fraud
ConAgra Foods, Inc. 2005 Environmental
Eli Lilly 2005 Environmental
Monsanto 2005 FDCA
Stryker Orthopedics 2005 Kickbacks
American Int'l Group 2006 Securities Fraud
BankAtlantic 2006 Bank Secrecy Act
Boeing Co. 2006 Fraud
Flowserve 2006 FCPA
Medicis 2006 FDCA
Mellon Bank, N. A. 2006 Other
Schering Plough 2006 FDCA / Kickbacks
Tyco International, Ltd. 2006 FCPA
WesternGeco LLC (subsidiary of Schlumberger Seismic, Inc.) 2006 FCPA
Williams Power Co. 2006 Commodities Fraud
Winn-Dixie Stores Inc. 2006 FCPA
American Express Bank Int'l 2007 Bank Secrecy Act
Baker Hughes 2007 FCPA
Biomet Inc. 2007 Kickbacks
Chevron 2007 FCPA
Chiquita Brands International 2007 Transactions with Terrorist
DePuy Orthopaedics 2007 Kickbacks
Elan Corp. 2007 FDCA
Express Scripts Inc. 2007 FDCA
Honeywell International 2007 Environmental
ITT 2007 Import / Export
Ingersoll Rand 2007 FCPA
Maximus 2007 Health Care Fraud
Overseas Shipholding Group Inc. 2007 Environmental
Pfizer 2007 FDCA / Kickbacks
Reliant Energy Services 2007 Fraud
Rowan Companies 2007 Environmental
Southern Union Co. 2007 Environmental
Textron 2007 FCPA
Archer Daniels Midland Company 2008 FDCA
Cephalon 2008 FDCA
Exxon Mobil Corporation 2008 Environmental
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Company Name Prosecution Year Crime
Faro Technologies 2008 FCPA
Forest Laboratories 2008 FDCA
Hershey Creamery Company 2008 Environmental
Lawson Products, Inc. 2008 Fraud
MTS Systems Corp 2008 False statement
Prudential Equity Group 2008 Securities Fraud
Republic Services, Inc. 2008 Immigration
Spartan Motors Chassis 2008 Kickbacks
Union Pacific Railroad Company 2008 Environmental
Unum Group 2008 Fraud
Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corp. 2008 FCPA
XTO Energy Inc. 2008 Wildlife
AGCO Corporation 2009 FCPA
Beazer Homes USA, Inc. 2009 Mortgage fraud
Halliburton Company 2009 FCPA
Helmerich & Payne 2009 FCPA
Kellogg Brown & Root LLC (KBR) 2009 FCPA
Pilgrim's Pride, Inc. 2009 Immigration
Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (& Nichols Institute Diagnostics) 2009 FDCA
UTStarcom, Inc. 2009 FCPA
Wellcare Health Plans, Inc. 2009 Health Care Fraud
Allergan 2010 FDCA
Alliance One 2010 FCPA
CVS/Pharmacy 2010 Food and Drug
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. 2010 Environmental
G&K Services Inc. 2010 Wildlife
Innospec Inc. 2010 Wildlife
Kos Pharmaceuticals 2010 Kickbacks
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (MetLife) 2010 Other
Noble Corp. 2010 FCPA
PPG Industries 2010 Import / Export
Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp. 2010 Bribery
Transocean 2010 FCPA
Universal Corp. 2010 FCPA
Alpha Natural Resources, Inc. 2011 Environmental - Mine Act
Aon Corp. 2011 FCPA
Google 2011 FDCA
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2011 Antitrust
Merck & Co., Inc. 2011 FDCA
Amgen 2012 FDCA
MoneyGram Int'l, Inc. 2012 Bank Secrecy Act
Scotts Miracle-gro 2012
United Technologies Corp. 2012 Import / Export
Diebold 2013 FCPA
Duke Energy Renewables Inc. 2013 Environmental
Parker Drilling 2013 FCPA
Ralph Lauren 2013 FCPA
United Parcel Service (UPS) 2013 Drug
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 2013 Environmental
Weatherford 2013 FCPA
Avon Products Inc. 2014 FCPA
Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. 2014 FCPA
Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 2014 FDCA
Gulfport Energy Corp 2014 Environmental
SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. 2014 Fraud
ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O. 2014 FCPA
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Appendix B:  List of CEOs that were replaced in the prosecution year 
 
 
 
CEO (replaced) Company Name Prosecution Year
Diana D. Brooks Sotheby's Holdings Inc. 2000
David H. Komansky Merrill Lynch 2003
Sanjay Kumar Computer Associates 2004
Vincent A. Calarco Crompton Corp. 2004
Bruce C. Rohde ConAgra Foods, Inc. 2005
John W. Brown Stryker Orthopedics 2005
James A. Bell Boeing Co. 2006
Kevin E. Sheehan Flowserve 2006
Martin G. McGuinn Mellon Bank, N. A. 2006
Daniel P. Hann Biomet Inc. 2007
Karen L. Katen Pfizer 2007
Lynn P. Davenport Maximus 2007
Joel V. Staff Reliant Energy Services 2007
Richard H. Lenny Hershey Creamery Company 2008
Sidney W. Emery, Jr. MTS Systems Corp 2008
Arthur F. Ryan Prudential Equity Group 2008
J. Clinton Rivers Pilgrim's Pride, Inc. 2009
Richard L. Marcantonio G&K Services Inc. 2010
Robert L. Long Transocean 2010
Richard T. Clark Merck & Co., Inc. 2011
Eric E. Schmidt, Ph.D. Google 2011
Kevin W. Sharer Amgen 2012
Thomas W. Swidarski Diebold 2013
James E. Rogers, Jr. Duke Energy Renewables Inc. 2013
James D. Palm Gulfport Energy Corp 2014
